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A Tug of War: The War Powers
Resolution and The Meaning
of "Hostilities"
"The provision of the constitution giving the warmaker power to
the Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following
reasons. Kings had always been involving their people in wars,
pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was
the object. This, our Convention undertook to be the most oppressive
of all kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Con-
stitution that no one should hold the power of bringing this oppres-
sion upon us."'
Abraham Lincoln
A significant legal and political issue before the nation today con-
cerns the war powers of the nation. The struggle between the executive
branch and Congress over the war powers has been dormant for the
past several years, following the spotlight attention received during
the Vietnam era. 2 The war powers issue involves a struggle between
the President and Congress over the power to commit United States
armed forces to war. The controversy over war powers has been revived
by the latest policies of the Reagan Administration concerning military
involvement in Lebanon and Central America.3
The crux of the controversy involves two conflicting interpretations
of the term "hostilities" and the phrase "imminent involvement in
hostilities" which are found in the War Powers Resolution 4 (hereinafter
1. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herdon (Feb. 15, 1848) reprinted in R.
BASLER, THE CoLLcTD WOS oF ABBRA~~m LINCOLN 451-52 (1953).
2. During the 1973 Hearings, Congress considered over thirty war power bills and resolu-
tions. See Spong, Can Balance Be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President
and Congress?, 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (1971) (for review of war powers proposals considered
by Congress in the years prior to 1972). See also Revely, Constitutional Allocation of the War
Powers Between the President and Congress, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1974); Spong, The War
Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender? 16 WM. & MARY 823
(1975) (for review of legislative history from 1972 to the passage of the WPR).
3. See, e.g., Congress Faces Fight with Reagan over Marines in Lebanon, S.F. Examiner
& Chronicle, Sept. 11, 1983 at A12, col. 1; Incidents in Lebanon and El Salvador... Raises
New Concerns on Capitol Hill, 41 CONGRESSIONAL QuARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 342-43 (1983);
see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1982 at NI8, col. 4; N.Y. Times Nov. 17, 1982 at N27, col.
2; Percy Insists on Approval by Congress to Expand Role in Lebanon, 40 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 2941.
4. 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548 (1976). On November 7, 1973, the House of Representatives
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the WPR). The Reagan Administration defines these terms very
narrowly,5 whereas Congress prefers a much broader interpretation.,
By applying standard statutory construction, this comment will show
that the definition of the Reagan Administration is inconsistent with
the intent, objective, purpose, and spirit of the WPR.
In 1973, the WPR was enacted as a response to congressional and
public disenchantment over the Vietnam conflict. 7 The WPR requires
the President to make a formal report and consult Congress if he
undertakes certain military actions without a declaration of war.8 The
WPR also provides that the President must seek congressional ap-
proval to keep United States troops where hostilities or imminent in-
volvement in hostilities are present.9
Prior to the Vietnam conflict, a steady growth of independent ex-
ecutive power in committing American forces into combat existed."0
From 1940 to 1970, the executive branch held an overwhelming foreign
affairs predominance. '" During that period, othe President involved
United States troops in major wars and ordered fighting without any
and the Senate voted to override President Nixon's veto of H.J. Res. 542. The House overrode
by a vote of 284 to 135 and the Senate followed by an overwhelming 75 to 18 vote. 119
CONG. REc. 520, 115 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
5. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
7. JAviTS, J. WHO MA=.s WAR: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CoNoREsS 268-71 (1973).
"This legislation is reactive to the Vietnam War-nothing more-nothing less." Statement of
Representative Kemp. CoNo. REc. 83866. See also War Powers, Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 149 (Statement by Mr. Brown, acting Legal Advisor, Depart-
ment of State) [hereinafter referred to as 1973 House Hearings]. A Gallup poll conducted shortly
after the WPR was enacted indicated that 80% of the American people approved of the new
law. MULLEN, PREsIDENTIAL POWER AND POLnCS 102 (1976).
8. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
9. 50 U.S.C. §1544(b).
10. Five times in the past twenty-two years, Presidents have mounted major military interven-
tions without prior consultation with the Congress. The interventions include the Bay of Pigs,
the intervention in the Dominican Republic, the bombing of North Vietnam, and the incursion
into Cambodia and Laos. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 98. See also War Powers
Legislation, Hearings on S. 731, S.J. Res. 18, and S.J. Res. 59. Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 359 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as 1971 Senate Hear-
ings]. For a chronological list of 153 military actions taken by the United States without a
declaration of war see id. at 298. For a categorization of major United States armed actions
overseas with the relevant congressional action see id.
11. Rovine, Congressional-Executive Relations and the United States Foreign Policy, 17
WiLAvAn T L.J. 41, 42 (1980); see also FzAcK, FOREIGN PoLIcY BY CONGRESS, 65-67 (1979).
According to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, the recent trend in Presidential
usurpations of the war power originated with President Theodore Roosevelt's use of the Navy
to prevent Columbia from reasserting jurisdiction over its rebellious province of Panama, and
his intervention in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Those precedents were reinforced by
Presidents William Taft's and Wilson's unauthorized use of armed forces in the Caribbean
and Central America culminating in the establishment of American military governments in
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. CONG. REc. 17936 (1974). Historian Arthur
Schiesinger, Jr. believes that President McKinley set the trend by sending 5000 American troops
to the siege of Peking in 1906. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1974 at 1, col. 4.
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congressional authorization. 2 The dominant purpose of the WPR was
to counter this trend by ensuring that the collective judgment of
Congress and the President will be applied when United States forces
are introduced into hostilities.' 3 The WPR was intended to prevent
situations similar to Vietnam, that is, ". . . situations in which a
President could gradually build up American involvement in a foreign
war without congressional knowledge or approval, eventually present-
ing Congress with a full-blown undeclared war which on a practical
level it was powerless to stop."' 4 By enacting the WPR, Congress,
in effect, was asserting what was believed to be its constitutional role
in the process of collective decision-making regarding matters of war
and peace.'"
Subsequent to the passage of the WPR, a number of international
incidents occurred in which the President, because of the nature of
the commitment of American troops, invoked provisions of the WPR.' 6
12. CONG. REc. 17936 (1974).
13. 50 U.S.C. §1541(a).
14. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (1982).
15. The allocation of power to commit the United States to war receives extensive treat-
ment in the constitution. Specific functions are granted to one political branch to the exclusion
of the other. The President is Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy, and Militia. U.S.
CONST. art. 2, §2. He also receives Ambassadors and other public Ministers. Id. Congress is
to provide for the common defense and the general welfare of the naion. Id. art. 1, §8,
c. 1. Congress is also "to declare war" and to "raise and support armies". Id. art. 1, §
8, c. 11, 12. Congress makes rules which regulate and govern the military forces, and has
the power for calling out the militia to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel inva-
sions. Id. art. 2, §8, col. 1.
Constitutional history supports the proposition that Congress was the body that was to be
entrusted with the power to make war. James Wilson told the Constitutional Convention that
the power to "declare" war was lodged in Congress as a guard against being "hurried" into
war, so that "no single man (can) . .. involve us in such distress." 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES
IN TBE SEaVRL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THm FEDERAL CONSTTUTION 528 (2 ed.
1836). The severely limited role of the President was a studied response to what Madison called
"an axiom that the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity
to war; hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this
propensity of its influence." J. MADIsON, LETrERS OF HELVIDius, IN WRITINGS 138, 174 (G.
Hunt ed. 1906). Those who were to conduct a war, according to Madison, could not in the
nature of things, be proper or safe judges of whether a war ought to be commenced, con-
tinued, or concluded. Id. at 148. The framers designed the role merely for command of the
Army as "first general." Id. See also Alstyne, Congress, The President, and the Power to
Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam., 121 UNrv. OF PA. L. REv. 1 (1972); Burger, War-Making
by the President, 121 UNrv. OF PA. L. REy. 29 (1972); Sofart, The Presidency, War and Foreign
Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAw AND CorrTip. PRos. 12 (1976). But see Rostow,
Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. REv. 833 (1972).
16. During the Ford Administration, four incidents were formally reported under the WPR:
(1) the transportation of refugees from Danang, April 1975; (2) the evacuation of U.S. na-
tionals from Phnom Penh, April 1975; (3) the evacuation of U.S nationals and others from
Saigon, April 1975; and (4) the rescue of the Mayaguez and its crew, Koh Tang Island. War
Powers: A Test of Compliance, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security
and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives,
94th Congress, 1st Sess., (1975) [hereinafter referred to as A Test of Compliance]. Two in-
cidents not reported by the Ford Administration were: (1) the evacuation of United States na-
tionals and other civilians during the civil turmoil in Cyprus and Lebanon, June 1976; and
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Public interest in the WPR has been rekindled by President Reagan's
deployment of American Marines in the multinational peacekeeping
force in Lebanon and by the Administration policy toward Central
America.'7 Recent commitments of United States armed forces abroad
have precipitated complaints that the Reagan Administration is send-
ing troops into hostile situations without the approval of Congress
as required by the WPR.'8
In Lebanon, for example, about 1200 United States Marines are
serving in a 4000-man peacekeeping force along with French and Italian
troops.' 9 That force has been enlarged by the deployment of an addi-
tional 2000 Marines stationed off the coast of Lebanon. "0 Shortly after
their first deployment, one Marine died and three others were injured
when a land mine exploded. 2' In August and September of 1983, the
Marines came under attack by Druse Moslems and returned fire, waging
firefights near the airport. 2 Five Marines were killed and twenty-four
wounded.23
Central America, according to the Reagan Administration, has
become an East-West battleground, with the national security of all
the Americas at stake.2 " Officials have announced plans for a large
scale extended United States military presence near the Honduran border
with Nicaragua. 5 A naval battle force has been posted off the Cen-
tral American Coast and plans have been approved for a limited
(2) the augmentation of United States troops in Korea after two American personnel were killed
in the tree cutting incident, August 1976. Memorandums on War Powers and Korean Deployments
by the acting Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, August 21, 1976. See also Zutz, The
Recapture of the Mayaguez: Failure of the Consultation Clause of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, 8 INTERN. LAW AND POL. 457 (1976). Of the two incidents during the Carter Administra-
tion, one incident, the Iranian rescue attempt, was formally reported. President Carter's letter
to House Speaker Thomas O'Neill, Jr. and Senator Magnuson, on Iran Rescue Effort, April
17, 1980; N.Y. Times, April 28, 1980. The airlift of European troops to Shaba province, Zaire
during an invasion of Angola-based former Kattanga Gendarmes was not reported, June 1978.
Letter from the Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Chairman Sparkman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee concerning the War Powers Resolution and the U.S. Airlift opera-
tion in Zaire, Dec. 1, 1978. The Reagan Administration has sent three reports to Congress
under the WPR. Two reports involved the deployment of U.S. Marines in the peacekeeping
force in Lebanon, dated August 24, 1982, 18 WEEKLY ComPILATION OF PREs. DocUtMaENTS, 1048
and September 29, 1982, 18 XvEEKLY CoMPvrm oNs oF PREs. DoctIENrs 1232. The sending
of jets and AWACS to Chad prompted a report pursuant to the WPR on August 9, 1983.
Sacramento Union, Aug. 9, 1983 at 1, col. 5.
17. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. 40 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 2413, 2469 (1982).
20. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at 8Y, col. 1.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1983, at YI, col. 4.
23. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at Y6, col. 2.
24. Taubman, Worst-Case Plans for Central America, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1983, at 2E.
col. 3.
25. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, at YI, col. 6.
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blockade of Nicaragua.26 Military leaders say they are willing to send
American forces to Central America if they can ". . . use enough
muscle to get the job done."27 One Navy Military advisor, Lieutenant
Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger, was shot to death as he sat
in his car in San Salvador.28 Following the death of Lieutenant
Schaufelberger, the Popular Liberation Forces, which claimed respon-
sibility for the incident, said the killing of advisors would continue
until the United States withdraws from El Salvador. 29
The recent events in Lebanon and Central America indicate a deepen-
ing United Staes involvement and an expanded military role in both
regions. This involvement raises the question of whether the WPR
should be activated, and if so, whether the President is required by
law to consult Congress pursuant to the WPR. Whether the WPR
has been activated depends on the definition of "hostilities" or "im-
minent involvement in hostilities." 3 The Reagan Administration takes
the position that hostilities are not present unless United States armed
forces are actively engaged in an armed confrontation between op-
posing forces involving an exchange of fire.31 Prior to mid-September
1983, the President refused to seek congressional approval under the
WPR for any of his military actions, preferring instead to report troop
deployments under sections of the WPR that do not require congres-
sional approval,3 2 or to report without specifying any section of the
WPR.33
This comment will propose that the letter and spirit of the WPR
require that hostilities be interpreted broadly to include the commit-
ment of troops short of actual combat. First, this author will explain
the major provisions of the WPR. The failure of the President to
report pursuant to the proper section of the WPR then will be ex-
plored as applicable to the situation in Lebanon. Next, because the
word "hostilities" is undefined by the WPR, a literal meaning of
the term will be examined. Upon finding the term ambiguous, and
therefore susceptible to different meanings, extrinsic aids will be used
to interpret hostilities. An examination of several extrinsic aids reveals
conflicting interpretations between the executive branch and Congress.
26. Id.
27. See Taulman, supra note 24, at 2E, col. 3.
28. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1983, at YI, col. 1.
29. San Francisco Chronicle, July 14, 1983, at 16, col. 4.
30. 50 U.S.C. §§1543(a)(1), 4(a)(1).
31. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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To resolve these conflicting interpretations, the author then will ex-
amine the circumstances existing at the time the WPR was enacted,
the objective and purpose of the WPR, the evil that Congress sought
to prevent by enacting the WPR, and the spirit of the WPR. These
aids support a broad interpretation of hostilities and indicate that the
inconsistent, narrow interpretation adopted by the President was not
intended by Congress. Finally, this comment will propose that sec-
tion 4(a)(1) of the WPR is implicated when the intended definition
of hostilities is applied to the military situations in Lebanon and Central
America. This comment necessarily limits the factual analysis to events
that occurred prior to mid-September 1983 because of the rapidly
changing circumstances in Lebanon and Central America. To under-
stand the WPR, a brief look at the mechanism which Congress
designed to recapture its share of war making power is important.
A. The War Powers Resolution
Prior to the passage of the WPR, Congress was faced with a situa-
tion in which its war powers had been eroded almost to nonexistence.34
The decline of the congressional hold on the war powers apparently
stemmed from a number of intertwined factors, including outright
abdication of influence by the legislators, 3 aggressive pursuit of in-
fluence by the executive,3 6 and the heightened pace, complexity, and
hazard of international affairs.3 The WPR sought to correct the con-
stitutional imbalance that had arisen between the executive branch
and Congress in the area of war powers.38
Under the WPR, the President must send Congress a report within
forty-eight hours after he introduces United States troops into the
following situations:
(1) into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;39
(2) into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; 40 or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States forces
34. WIvcox AND FRANK, TBE CoNsrunoN AND THm CoNDucT op FOREIGN PoucY 84 (1976).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Amendment to War Powers Resolution, United States Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, S.2179, May 4, 1982 at 186. [hereinafter cited as Amendment to the WPR].
39. 50 U.S.C. §§4(a)(1), 1543(a)(1).
40. Id. §§4(a)(2), 1543(a)(2).
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equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation. 1
The report is to present the circumstances necessitating the introduc-
tion of forces,"2 the constitutional and legislative authority under which
the introduction took place, 3 and the estimated scope and duration
of the hostilities or involvement. 44
If the President reports to Congress under the first circumstance,
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR is activated.4 5 According to section 4(a)(1),
the President then must withdraw the troops within sixty days unless
Congress has declared war, extended the sixty day period, or is unable
to meet because of an attack on the United States." If the President
reports under either of the other circumstances, section 4(a)(2) or 4(a)(3)
of the WPR is activated. 7 Under section 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3), Con-
gress has no automatic right to review the presence of troops on foreign
soil, and the sixty day period is not activated."
If troops are introduced into hostilities and the President reports
to Congress under section 4(a)(1), the failure of Congress to act within
sixty days constitutes a negative response and the troops must be
withdrawn. 49 At the same time, Congress has the prerogative to pass
a concurrent resolution to terminate the involvement.50 The constitu-
tionality of the concurrent resolution has recently been the subject
of controversy. In a seven-two decision, the Supreme Court, in LN.S.
v. Chadha,5 struck down the legislative veto, saying legislative vetoes
of executive branch acts violate fundamental structural provisions of
the United States Constitution. The Court struck down a portion of
a 1952 federal immigration law that allowed the House of Represen-
tatives to order, over objections from the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, the deportation of J. Chadha, a Kenyan living in Califor-
nia who had overstayed his student visa. 2
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, appears to
indicate that the Court was seizing the opportunity to rule in the
41. Id. §§4(a)(3), 1543(a)(3).
42. Id. §1543(a)(3)(A).
43. Id. §1543(a)(3)(B).
44. Id. §1543(a)(3)(C).
45. Id. §1543(a)(1).
46. Id. §1544(b).
47. Id. §1543(a)(2)(3).
48. Id. §1544(b).
49. Withdrawal is automatically required after 60 days if Congress is inactive. Id. §1544(b).
See also Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?,
16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 823, 844, 849 (1975).
50. 50 U.S.C. §1544(c).
51. 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (1983).
52. Id.
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strongest language and as broadly as possible on the question." Chief
Justice Burger's opinion struck at the very notion of legislative vetoes
of every variety, pointing out that the drafters of the Constitution
spelled out a uniform procedure in Article I for enacting laws, and
the framers of the Constitution did not intend for the lawmakers to
bypass that procedure.5"
The precise impact of Chadha on the termination provision of the
WPR has not yet been determined. Some members of Congress ques-
tioned whether the case would even affect the WPR, 5 while others
speculated that the ruling would strip Congress of the power to re-
quire the President to withdraw American troops from foreign
hostilities.56 Authority suggests that the concurrent resolution veto pro-
vision of the WPR is essentially different from that overturned in
Chadha.5" The distinction drawn is that the legislative veto in the WPR
does not concern power delegated by Congress.58 Instead, the prob-
lem has been to determine how the legislative and executive branches
share a responsibility regarding war making that combines elements
of both congressional and Presidential power. Unable to define by
statute the precise boundaries between the branches, Congress relied
on the legislative veto as a procedural safeguard between potentially
conflicting constitutional interpretations.5 9 Furthermore, section
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which was held
unconstitutional in Chadha, was a particularly egregious violation of
the separation of powers because section 244(c)(2) operated to reverse
the outcomes of adjudications rather than merely prevent the pro-
mulgation of general, prospective rules.6" A veto that reverses the out-
come of an adjudication is a positive seizure by Congress of powers
constitutionally allocated to the President and the judiciary.6 The
WPR, on the other hand, has been considered an intermediate veto
because it asserts congressional power in a "twilight zone," an area
in which the holder of the power absent the WPR is debatable.62
Even if the concurrent resolution, as a mechanism of the WPR,
is specifically held to be unconstitutional, the other requirements of
53. L.A. Daily J., July 24, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
54. Id. at 4914, 4915.
55. L.A. Daily J., June 24, 1983, at 16, col. 2.
56. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at YI, col. 6.
57. See Knoeckel, Immigration Law: Constitutionality of One-House Legislative Veto of
Stays in Deportation, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423, 428 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 427.
61. Id. at 428.
62. Id. at 428 n.36.
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the WPR would remain valid. 63 The WPR contains provisions con-
cerning the possible invalidation of one or more of its provisions and
provides in section 9, the separability clause, that if any provision
of the WPR is held invalid, the remainder of the statute shall not
be affected. 64 One remaining section of importance is section 5(b),
which calls for an automatic termination of hostilities lasting more
than sixty days unless Congress assents by specific authorization.65
This author leaves to another day, or to others, a discussion of the
constitutionality of the concurrent resolution provision contained in
the WPR in light of Chadha.
Assuming the concurrent resolution mechanism is constitutional, both
houses of Congress can terminate any undeclared war as soon as a
war begins or any time thereafter.6 6 The power of Congress to ter-
minate United States involvement can be exercised after the commence-
ment of any hostilities, and for any legal, strategic, or political reason. 67
These two termination provisions, congressional failure to act and
the concurrent resolution, are coupled with priority procedures designed
to ensure swift congressional action.6"
As of mid-September, President Reagan failed to report to Congress
pursuant to the WPR concerning military involvement in Central
America. 69 The President reported the circumstances in Lebanon to
63. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
64. 50 U.S.C. §1548 provides: "If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof
of any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application
of such provision to any other person or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Id.
65. Id. §1544(b) provides:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted
pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier, the President shall
terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report
was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared
war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable
to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period
shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President deter-
mines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respect-
ing the safety of the United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
66. Id. §1544(c) provides: "Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time
that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of
the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific
statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Con-
gress so directs by concurrent resolution."
67. Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control
over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L'L. 605, 613 (1977).
68. 50 U.S.C. §1545. Once the President reports a use of force to Congress, any member
of Congress can introduce a bill supporting or opposing the President's actions. The bill would
move swiftly through committee, and would be submitted to a vote by the full Congress within
a maximum of sixty days. Id.
69. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Congress under section 4(a)(2), but has repeatedly failed to invoke
4(a)(1), claiming hostilities are not present. 70 By refusing to admit
that hostilities are present in Lebanon, President Reagan in effect,
has skirted the requirements of section 4(a)(1).
B. Sidestepping the Reporting Requirements
When President Reagan initially raised the possibility of sending
troops to Lebanon, Administration officials reportedly told congres-
sional leaders that President Reagan would cite section 4(a)(2). 71 The
President claimed the United States troops were being sent "equip-
ped for combat" into a zone where there was no likelihood of being
involved in combat. 72 Section 4(a)(2) would not require congressional
approval of the stationing of the troops." Congressional leaders in-
terpreted this Presidential action as an attempt to capriciously avoid
the proper role of Congress as defined by the WPR.74 At a meeting
with congressional leaders, President Reagan admitted a disagreement
existed over what section the President should cite in his report, but
he nevertheless promised to adhere not only to the spirit, but to the
letter of the WPR. 75 When the time actually arrived to report to Con-
gress, the President failed to specify in his letter to Congress the par-
ticular subsection of the WPR under which he was reporting.76
The letter contained several provisions explaining why the Presi-
dent felt imminent hostilities were not present, thereby eliminating
the requirement of congressional approval under section 4(a)(1). 77 Ac-
cording to the President, he had no intention or expectation that United
States troops would become involved in hostilities. 7 Furthermore, an
agreement with Lebanon expressly ruled out any combat responsibilities
70. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
71. 40 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLy REPORT 1695 (1982).
72. Id.
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. 40 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPoRT 1695 (1982). Clement Zablocki, D-
Wis., chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, complained that an "equipped for
combat" report would not accurately describe the circumstances in Beirut and would rob Con-
gress of its rightful role in determining how long the troops stayed. Id. at 2158.
75. Id. at 1695.
76. Id. at 2158. An informed State Department official said debate on the issue within
the administration had produced three reasons for not citing any specific section of the act:
(1) the administration planned to withdraw the Marines within 30 days in any event, which
would make the WPR moot; (2) assurances were given from all parties concerned that
the U.S. forces would be in no danger of hostilities; and (3) the official said "Zablocki made
it clear that his preference was that we not report under the 'equipped for combat' provision."
Since the administration was unwilling to report under the first or "hostilities provision" the
official said, to cite no provisions "seemed the eminently sensible thing." Id.
77. Id. at 2157.
78. Id.
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for the forces. 79 This was buttressed with a statement that all armed
elements in the area gave assurances that they would not interfere
with the activities of the multinational force. 0 By asserting that
hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities were not present in
Lebanon, President Reagan avoided reporting pursuant to section
4(a)(1). Therefore, the sixty day period at the end of which the troops
would have to be removed was not activated.
The serious and deepening involvement of the United States in Cen-
tral America would seem to activate at least one of the provisions
of the WPR. In February 1983, Democrats on the House Foreign
Affairs Committee launched a sustained attack of the President's
failure to report to Congress that military advisors in El Salvador
were in danger of becoming involved in hostilities. 8' The President,
however, has not reported to Congress on the matter.8 2 This com-
ment proposes that the WPR is activated, and furthermore, that the
report should be made pursuant to section 4(a)(1).
Upon a finding that hostilities are present or imminent involvement
is clearly indicated by the circumstances in Lebanon and Central
America, President Reagan is required to report the activities pur-
suant to section 4(a)(1).13 Continued maintenance of the military opera-
tions, then, would be subject to congressional approval." To decide
if section 4(a)(1) of the WPR is activated, hostilities must be defined.
C. Defining Hostilities
The breadth and scope of the WPR turns on the meaning of the
word hostilities. Hostilities and situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances are the
key definitional phrases in the WPR, but are undefined by the WPR. s5
The term hostilities is used to broadly describe the military activity that
the WPR is intended to govern and is included in section 4(a)(1),
the most stringent provision of the WPR. s6 Section 4(a)(1) provides
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 41 CONGRESSIONAL QuAR-rERLY WEEKLY REPORT 342: The "attack" occurred two days
after a U.S. Army sergeant suffered a leg wound in a helicopter in which he was riding was
fired upon by guerillas. Committee Chairman Zablocki said the Reagan Administration was
caught in a "contradiction." On one hand, the Administration had not invoked the WPR,
contending that the advisors were not engaged in hostilities. At the same time, the advisors
received "hostile fire" pay bonuses. Id.
82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
85. A Test of Compliance, supra note 16, at 36; see also King & Leavens, Curbing The
Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J 55, 71, 78 (1977).
86. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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that when United States troops are introduced into hostilities, the Presi-
dent must withdraw the troops within sixty days unless Congress has
acted. 7 This section has become the most controversial and debated
provision of the WPR.1s
The WPR is now codified in Title 50 United States Code Sections
1541-1548.79 The interpretation of these statutes is guided by certain
general rules of construction."0 The first step in interpreting a federal
statute is to give effect to the intent of Congress.' To ascertain this
intent, the first reference is to the literal meaning of the words
employed. 92 The plain and obvious meaning of the words in the statute
is the safest interpretation and most clearly expresses legislative intent. 93
Each word and phrase must be given its plain meaning, and only
when ambiguity exists in the phraseology of a statute may extraneous
data be considered to aid in the interpretation. 94
Congress is presumed to have used words according to their or-
dinary meaning unless a different use is clearly indicated. 9" Since no
specialized or technical meaning was ascribed to the word hostilities, 96
a logical assumption is that Congress had none in mind and intended
that hostilities be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The follow-
ing section interprets hostilities by applying the above analysis.
1. The Literal Meaning of Hostilities
If the common meaning of a term is involved in interpreting statutes,
a court may consult dictionaries, lexicons, and other written
authorities.97 The dictionary definition of hostilities provides a start-
ling point, but unfortunately, the various definitions afford little
guidance. Webster's Dictionary defines hostilities as "overt acts of
war." 98 Black's Law Dictionary defines hostilities as "having the
character of an enemy" and "standing in the relation of an enemy." 99
87. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
89. 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548.
90. Frankfurter, Some Reflections On The Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.R. 527 (1947);
see also Landis, Statutory Interpretations, 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 863 (1930).
91. Johnson Service Company v. H.S. Kaiser Company, 324 F. Supp. 745, 749 (1971).
92. Id.
93. National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123, 126 (1972).
94. American Express Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 778, 780 (1968).
95. Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (1981).
96. Evidence from the congressional hearings indicates hostilities was not ascribed a special-
ized meaning. Senator Javits stated "(I) am inclined to leaving 'hostilities' undefined as a word
of art. That is preferable, but I am not adamant on this." 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note
10, at 560.
97. Certified Blood Donors Services, Inc. v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 964, 966 (1974).
98. WEasmTs THRD INTERNATioNAL DI cTioNARY 1094 (1971).
99. BL.cK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 664 (5th ed. 1979).
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Various levels, forms, and degrees of violence in the relations of armed
parties exist.' 0 The dictionary definitions, being quite broad and
general, fail to make clear where on the scale of violence hostilities
exist in the context of the WPR.
Under principles of international law, the term hostilities is more
precise, but, as will be shown, not precise enough to describe the
varying degrees of hostilities sufficient to warrant the application of
the WPR. Hostilities is often discussed in reference to "war" in in-
ternational law."' The term hostilities has generally been adopted as
a more practical than legal term, and is considered a form of armed
conflict not amounting to war.' 2 The manual of Public International
Law defines hostilities as consisting of the mutual application of
violence and coercion by armed forces of contending states.' 3 In in-
terpreting Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the state of
war was distinguished from hostilities, with hostilities ranging from
minor border incidents to extensive military operations.'0 4 In Britian
S.S. Co. v. The King,' 5 Lord Atkinson stated that hostilities, a term
of no narrower scope than war, connotes the "idea of belliger-
ants .... I0 6 Some experts in international law concerning armed con-
flict have construed the term to mean all hostilities and defined
hostilities as "violent behavior."'0 7 Again, these definitions are too
ambiguous and broad to draw the fine line needed to ascertain the
threshold level of violence needed to implicate section 4(a)(1) of the
WPR. Additionally, the definitions and references to hostilities are
too varied to reach a solid consensus on the meaning of hostilities.
2. Hostilities as an Ambiguous Term
The determination that "hostilities" is an ambiguous term and
therefore, susceptible to different meanings, is supported by selected
provisions from congressional hearings. In general, opposition to
defining hostilities precisely or too narrowly was evidenced throughout
100. S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 416
(1971).
101. The practice of states continues to distinguish between the state of war and hostilities.
The distinction, however, is not maintained consistently throughout the law. For example, the
Hague Convention No. III concerning the opening of hostilities, speaks of the commencement
of war in terms of hostilities. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 804 (1968).
102. See Lazareff, supra note 100, at 416.
103. See Sorenson, supra note 101, at 416.
104. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1982).
105. 1921 1 A.C. 99 (1920).
106. Evans, Judicial Decisions, 69 Am. J. OF INT'L L. 406, 423 (1975).
107. FRIEDMAN, TIE LAw OF WAR, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 745 (1972).
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congressional hearing records.' °8 The idea of making a "laundry list"
or spelling out the circumstances in which the President may involve
the military in the absence of a declaration of war was rejected.' 9
Rather than attempting to codify the circumstances that define hostilities,
Professor Bickel, a noted constitutional law expert and Professor of
Law at Yale University, stated that the preferable mode was a good
faith understanding of the term and an assumption that Presidents
would act in good faith to discharge their duties."10 Senator Javits,
one of the chief sponsors of the WPR, acknowledged that the resolu-
tion did not endeavor to spell out a definition of hostilities, but
adopted the term as a word of basic understanding."' Members of
Congress recognized the peril in trying to be too exact with defini-
tions because of the difficulties in achieving a terminology that could
anticipate all the emergencies which might arise. ' 2 By choosing a
general approach, rather than trying to be too exact in definitions,
something was "left to judgment, the intelligence, [and] the wisdom"
of members of Congress and the President." 3 Based on the hearings,
some evidence also exists that hostilities was deliberately left undefined
and ambiguous so that the meaning of the word could be clarified
or gradually spelled out by experience.1 4
3. The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Interpret Hostilities
As demonstrated, the meaning of hostilities is unclear and ambig-
uous; therefore, extrinsic aids may be used for interpretation."'
Examples of extrinsic aids are congressional hearings," ' committee
reports,' opinions of legal advisors to the President," 8  cir-
cumstances existing at the time the WPR was enacted," ' the objec-
108. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 599; see also id. at 572, where Professor
Bickel stated that he would be wary of trying too detailed a definition of the term hostilities,
"wary indeed always of unnecessary detailed definitions as if this were the Internal Revenue
Code." See also 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 93.
109. War Powers Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy
and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess., 30 (1971)
(statement by Mr. Bingham) [hereinafter referred to as 1971 House Hearings].
110. 1973 House Hearings, supra riote 7, at 185.
111. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 28.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Dr. Commanger analogized the term "hostilities," as used generally, to the phrase
"due process of law," which was gradually spelled out by experience. Id.
115. American Express Company v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 778, 780 (1968).
116. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 444 U.S. 986 (1980).
117. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric, 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1223 (1980).
118. BLACK, BLACK ON INiERPRETATION OF LAWS 90 (2d ed.).
119. Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1973).
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tive and purpose of the WPR,' 20 the evil that Congress sought to
prevent by the WPR, 12' and the spirit of the WPR. 2 2 The first ex-
trinsic aid available for interpreting the meaning of hostilities is the
various congressional hearings at which attempts were made to define
hostilities.
a. Congressional Hearings
The hearings held in the four years prior to adoption of the
WPR are relevant to a full understanding of the term hostilities.' 23
During the hearings, hypothetical situations were posed to assist in
determining what constituted hostilities. Representative Bingham, in
discussing the meaning of hostilities, stated that an operation in which
the United States supplied air transport did not constitute hostilities. 124
Supposing that Marine guards became involved in protecting an em-
bassy under siege, according to Representative Bingham, an involve-
ment in hostilities would have occurred.' 25
Two major sponsors of war power bills differed in their opinions
of whether hostilities were present if 2000 advisors were sent to Israel.
Speaking hypothetically, Senator Javits stated that the deployment of
advisors would not place them in a situation involving an imminent
threat to the forces. 2 6 On the other hand, Senator Eagleton stated
that the situation clearly indicated imminent involvement in hostilities,
although an active war did not exist at the time.'27
Congressional discussion of military actions undertaken by past
presidents resulted in classifying certain situations as involving
hostilities. Senator Javits explained in a colloquy with Representative
Bingham that the sending of United States planes over Cuba to take
pictures did not involve hostilities or imminent hostilities.'28 When
the United States insisted on inspecting ships at sea, then imminent
danger of hostilities may have been present.' 29 During the hearings
held in 1970,130 the sending of Marines into Lebanon by President
Eisenhower was considered a deployment of troops into an area where
120. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1980).
121. Benton, 488 F.2d at 1021.
122. General Serv. Emp. U. Local No. 773 v. N.L.R.B., 578 F.2d 361, 367 (1978).
123. South Corp. v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 180, 184 (1982).
124. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 92.
125. Id. at 93.
126. Id. at 21.
127. Id. at 73.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id.
130. Congress, The President, and the War Powers, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
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hostilities existed. 3' Likewise, the dispatch of Marines to the
Dominican Republic'32 and the defensive quarantine of Cuba were
clearly considered a commitment to hostilities.1
3
Senators Javits and Eagleton were also in disagreement over the
exact time when United States hostilities in Vietnam began. Senator
Javits' judgment was that hostilities began when President Johnson
deployed American forces in the combat situation, around March
1965.134 The sending of 2000 advisors by President Kennedy to Viet-
nam, according to Senator Javits, was not a commitment to immi-
nent hostilities. 3 1 The Senator stated that the United States became
involved in imminent hostilities when President Kennedy ordered United
States advisors to accompany South Vietnamese units on combat
patrols, with orders to shoot back.' 36 Senator Eagleton, on the other
hand, stated hostilities began sooner, possibly when the first advisor
was deployed in Vietnam. 137 In the end, Senator Eagleton concluded
that Congress must depend on the good faith of the President to report
pursuant to the WPR. 138
In military conflicts which gradually escalated, some authority sug-
gested that the dividing line for requiring congressional action was
either the initial commitment of regular United States combat units' 39
or the first combat casualty sustained by American forces. 4 ' The sug-
gestion was made that congressional authorization be required when
regular combat units are committed to sustained hostilities or when
regular combat units are committed to combat.'' A magnitude test
was discussed that would define major hostilities as a military engage-
ment involving substantial casualties, with major hostilities requiring
congressional approval.' 42 Others believed that the approval of Con-
gress was required when American soldiers were in danger of being
killed, even though the soldiers were in a supply unit or any other
kind of division. 43
Senate Joint Resolution 59,144 introduced by Senator Eagleton,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Congress, The President, and War Powers].
131. Id. at 413.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id. at 74.
138. Id.
139. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 474.
140. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 109, at 28.
141. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 474.
142. Id. at 465.
143. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 50.
144. The Eagleton Resolution was introduced on March 1, 1971, and was one of five war
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defined hostilities as including the deployment of United States forces
in a foreign land where imminent involvement in combat activities
was a reasonable possibility. "5 Also included was the assignment of
American soldiers to accompany, command, coordinate, or participate
in the movement of regular or irregular armed forces of a foreign
country when the foreign forces were engaged in any form of com-
bat activity. ' 6 Resolution 59 suggests that combat activities were con-
sidered to be the equivalent of hostilities.
Limited deployments of United States military advisors to coun-
tries where combat activities were in progress, or could be expected
to commence shortly, was recognized as becoming increasingly more
dangerous.' 7 This was especially true in an era when "brushfire"
wars and guerilla warfare were becoming common.' 8 Thus, some
members of Congress believed that congressional approval was
necessary when military advisors were dispatched into battle areas, 4 9
and when advisors were assigned to foreign troops in the field.'
Although congressional hearings are important in interpreting an
ambiguous term of a statute,' 5' in the instant case they fail to pro-
vide any clear or concise criteria for determining when hostilities are
present. At best, some general accord is present in defining several
circumstances which are clearly of sufficient military intensity that
a reasonable person would have little problem considering them as
constituting hostilities. On the other hand, Congress has been unable to
agree on a specific method for determining whether hostilities are pres-
ent in less intense circumstances. A second source of data used to shed
light on the meaning of hostilities is the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee Report on the WPR.
b. A Broad Meaning of Hostilities
The House Foreign Affairs Committee'12 (hereinafter H.F.A.C.) has
powers bills introduced in the Senate during that year. Eagleton, Congress, and The War Powers,
37 Miss. L. Rav. 1, 19 (1972).
145. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 198.
146. Id.
147. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 68.
148. Id.
149. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 198.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
152. Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.J. Res. 542, 93rd Cong., Ist
Sess., June 15, 1972. In the summer of 1973, the House of Representatives and the Senate
passed their respective versions of the war powers act, and these were referred to Conference
Committee to be reconciled. The result was H.J. Res. 542, which, on November 7, 1973, became
PL 93-148. GLENNON AND FRANCK, UNITD STATEs FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND
SOURCES 4 (1981).
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adopted its own definition of hostilities. The H.F.A.C. Report discusses
the background, constitutional context, and intent of the WPR.5 3
The section-by-section analysis of the H.F.A.C. Report is the clearest
statement of the definition of hostilities to be found:
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict
during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered
to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which
fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of
confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there
is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. Imminent hostilities
denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such
a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict.5 4
Hearings were held during the Ford Administration in which Chair-
man Zablocki used the definition as a benchmark in questioning legal
advisors to the President.'" The use of this definition by Zablocki
supports a broad interpretation of hostilities because as long as a clear
and present danger of armed conflict exists, even though no shots
have been fired, hostilities are present.'56 United States forces are not
required to accompany foreign forces in combat or on operational
patrols.' 7 The President, however, has persisted in defining hostilities
more narrowly than Congress apparently intended." 8 The Ford and
Reagan Administrations have both adopted a narrow definition of
hostilities that conflicts with the H.F.A.C. definition.
c. A Narrow Meaning of Hostilities
Hearings held in 1975 concerning the lack of full compliance with
the WPR by the Ford Administration were attended by Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor to the Department of State.5 9 During Mr. Leigh's
testimony, he was asked for his working definition of hostilities and
imminent hostilities, and how the definitions related to the first three
war power reports made by President Ford.' He was requested to
keep in mind the definition of hostilities as stated in the section-by-
section analysis of the H.F.A.C. Report.' 6 ' Mr. Leigh contended that
as defined, a large measure of judgment was required in interpreting
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. A Test of Compliance, supra note 16, at 36.
156. Supra note 154 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
159. A Test of Compliance, supra note 16, at 1.
160. Id. at 35.
161. Id. at 36.
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hostilities.'62 He further noted the differing views expressed during
prior hearings and stated that the term was definable only in the con-
text of an actual set of facts.' 63 While refusing to provide a generalized
definition, Mr. Leigh's working definition of hostilities was interpreted
to mean a situation in which United States troops were actively engaged
in exchange of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.'" Imminent
hostilities was defined as a situation in which a serious risk to the
safety of United Staes troops from hostile fire was present.' 65 According
to Mr. Leigh, neither hostilities nor imminent involvement in hostilities
encompassed irregular or infrequent violence that may have occurred
in a particular area.'66
With regard to the activities in Lebanon and Central America, Presi-
dent Reagan has followed precedent by maintaining a narrower
interpretation of the word hostilities than the House Foreign Affairs
Committee has adopted.' 67 In response to questions posed by the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, the State Department declared that
American forces would not go on patrol or on a combat mission with
Salvadoran forces, or otherwise be placed in situations where combat
was likely.' 61 Section 4(a)(1), therefore, would not be activated.
Hostilities were interpreted by the State Department to apply to any
armed confrontation between opposing forces involving an exchange
of fire, whether in a conventional or a guerilla conflict.' 69 This defini-
tion, closely tracking that of Mr. Leigh's, is similarly a narrow inter-
pretation requiring an actual exchange of fire between opposing forces.
The President's definition of the meaning of hostilities, when com-
pared to the definition stated in the H.F.A.C. Report, is extremely
narrow. The President requires armed confrontation between oppos-
ing forces involving an exchange of fire.' 71 In contrast, the H.F.A.C.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 37.
165. Id.
166. Id. During the hearings, Mr. Zablocki took issue with the restrictive definitions
of hostilities or imminent hostilities. He stated: "In the Cambodian situation even if there
was one artillery piece fired that is a hostile situation." Id. at 49. The definitions of hostilities
and imminent involvement in hostilities stated by Mr. Leigh correspond closely to views ex-
pressed by a Department of Defense representative in a 1974 letter to Representative Findley.
Although Findley, who had written much of the reporting requirements in the WPR, individually
countered the viewpoint found in the letter; the executive branch, nevertheless, persisted in
defining hostilities narrowly. Committee on Foreign Affairs, The War Powers Resolution, A
Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 202 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A Special
Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs].
167. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
168. War Powers Resolution and El Salvador, CoNo. REc., March 5, 1981.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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section-by-section analysis definition of hostilities encompasses situa-
tions in which no shots have been fired.'' Furthermore, the defini-
tion of imminent hostilities denotes a situation in which a clear poten-
tial for a state of confrontation or actual armed conflict exists.' 7 2
Generally, executive constructions should be accorded considerable
weight,' 73 however, executive interpretations should not stand when
inconsistent with legislative intent 174 and policy.' 7" The H.F.A.C.
Report indicates that the intended definition of hostilities by Con-
gress was broad and not narrow. This interpretation is supported by
further extrinsic aids.
To determine the weight to be accorded the President's different
and distinct view of the meaning of hostilities, other extrinsic aids
will be explored to clarify the interpretation of the President. This
comment contends that the President's interpretation is inconsistent
with the intent, purpose, and policy underlying the WPR. Further-
more, this comment will demonstrate that the restrictive definition of
hostilities cannot stand when viewed in light of the spirit of the WPR.
Other important extrinsic aids for interpretation of the WPR are the
circumstances existing at the time the WPR was enacted, the objec-
tive and purpose of the WPR, and the evil that Congress sought to
prevent by the WPR. An examination of these extrinsic aids reveals
that the narrow interpretation adopted by the executive branch is too
restrictive and incorrect.
d. Circumstances Existing at the Time the WPR was Enacted
The circumstances existing at the time the WPR was enacted in-
dicate that the President's narrow interpretation of hostilities should
be disregarded. The initial impetus for a number of bills and resolu-
tions on the war powers was the American incursion into Cambodia
in May 1970.6 This incident caused a crisis in relations between
the executive and legislative branches.' 77 The main difficulty involved
the commitment of United States military forces exclusively by the
President, purportedly under his authority as Commander in Chief,
but without congressional approval or adequate consultation with
Congress. 1
171. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
173. McGinnis v. Video Theatres, 262 F. Supp. 607, 614 (1967).
174. Brennan v. Udall, 251 F. Supp. 12, 23 (1966).
175. TH v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873, 880 (1975).
176. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Navs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, 2348.
177. Id. at 2349.
178. Id.
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The single issue of American involvement in the Vietnam War caused
members of Congress to reconsider the fundamental principles upon
which the nation was founded."7 9 Testimony received at the congres-
sional hearings confirmed the view of many that the constitutional
"imbalance" of authority over war making had swung heavily to the
President in modern times. 8 ' This authority had accrued to the Presi-
dent simply from its exercise, and not from any legal or constitu-
tional basis."' To restore the balance provided by the Constitution,
Congress reasserted its own prerogative and responsibilities by enacting
the WPR.182 The H.F.A.C. Report definition of hostilities is consistent
with this effort to restore the "balance" of authority over war powers
by requiring more reporting to Congress under section 4(a)(1). Thus,
regarding war making decisions, Congress can be a more effective
watchdog of the President. The objective and purpose of the WPR
also supports a broad interpretation of the term hostilities, rather than
the restrictive definition adopted by President Reagan.
e. The Objective and Purpose of the WPR
The objective and purpose of the WPR corroborates the H.F.A.C.
section-by-section definition of hostilities. The objective of the WPR
was to end Presidential dominance of war powers and to establish
a procedure for the close cooperation of the President and Congress in
the deployment and maintenance of troops abroad."8 3 By passing the
WPR, Congress codified the authority to place American troops
abroad.' 4
The purpose of the WPR, as clearly articulated on the face of the
WPR, was to ensure that the collective judgment of Congress and
the President would apply to the introduction of United States
armed forces into hostilities.8 5 The legislation was designed to pre-
vent future undeclared wars. 1 6 During the hearings, several purposes
were elucidated, including (a) to reaffirm the authority of the President
to act in emergencies,187 (b) to reaffirm the power of Congress to declare
war,'88 and (c) to require prior consultation with the Congress before
179. Id. at 2348.
180. Id. at 2349.
181. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 78.
182. U.S. CoNrG. & AD. Naws, supra note 176, at 2349.
183. Letter from Chairman Thomas E. Morgan, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nov.
1, 1973 (refuting President Nixon's veto message).
184. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 8.
185. 50 U.S.C. §1541 (1976).
186. Amendment to the WPR, supra note 38, at 189.
187. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7 at 8.
188. Id.
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involving the armed forces in hostilities. 18 9 The articulated purposes
of the WPR refute a narrow reading of hostilities because a restric-
tive interpretation would not encourage close cooperation between the
President and Congress. Instead, a narrow reading of hostilities places
significantly more authority with the President in committing troops
to foreign lands, rather than ensuring the collective judgment of both
Congress and the President.
Central to the war powers framework was the establishment of full
continuing communications between the Congress and the executive
branch.' 9° Congress was always to be fully apprised of United States
troop presence and strategic interest anywhere in the world that could
lead to involvement in armed conflict. 191 The insistence upon a case-
by-case consultation ensured that congressional input into war mak-
ing decisions would be keyed to particular circumstances and not pro-
vided generally.' 92 The most important consideration was to ensure
that Congress be interjected in the war making process at the onset
of military involvement.' 93 A broad or liberal interpretation of
hostilities supports the principle of ensuring that Congress be included
at the outset in all war making decisions. Narrowly interpreting
hostilities, on the other hand, would permit the President to involve
United States forces in military situations that gradually could build
into a foreign war without congressional approval. This restrictive
definition of hostilities, in addition to being inconsistent with the ob-
jective and purpose of the WPR, also is inconsistent with the evil
that Congress sought to prevent by enacting the WPR.
f. The Evil that Congress Sought to Prevent
Congress, by enacting the WPR, sought to prevent the evil of future
Vietnams, that is, unpopular and undeclared Presidential wars. 94 Con-
gress sought to avoid the commitment of United States armed forces
by the President to a prolonged conflict, without a clear definition
of the purpose of the commitment and the will of the people to pur-
sue a victory.' 95 Specifically, the WPR was a resolution to end the
practice of Presidential war. 9 6 An effort was made to learn from
189. Id.
190. Id. at 78.
191. Id.
192. U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere, 97th Congress, 2nd Sess., REPORT No. 97-470
at 5 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Policy in Western Hemisphere].
193. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 78.
194. Id. at 98.
195. Id. at 386. (Statement of Hon. Tom Railsback of Illinois.)
196. Id. at 8.
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the lessons of the tragic decade of war in Vietnam.'9 7 Vietnam cost
the nation very heavily in blood, treasure, and morale.' 9 The WPR
was adopted to assure that any future decision to commit the United
States to war must be shared by Congress to be lawful. 99 By
adopting a restrictive definition of hostilities and thereby excluding
congressional input, the executive branch again is claiming that the
decision to wage war is solely within its discretion. That claim is
precisely the evil that Congress sought to prevent by enacting the WPR.
Furthermore, a narrow interpretation of hostilities is inconsistent with
the spirit of the WPR.
g. The Spirit of the WPR
A settled rule of interpretation is that acts of Congress must be
interpreted in light of the spirit in which they were written. 20 0 The
WPR was born in the midst of tumultuous political pressures in
America. 21' The resolution was created as a response to a dangerous
imbalance in our constitutional checks and balances, that is, the pro-
longed engagement in undeclared wars. 22 By enacting the WPR, Con-
gress sought to prevent situations in which the incremental involve-
ment of United States troops could lead to full scale war.20' Con-
gress intended to prevent quagmires like Vietnam, where United States
forces were committed little-by-little, and then more and more, ex-
clusively by the President.20 4 This allegedly occurred under the Presi-
dent's authority as Commander in Chief, but without debate, con-
sultation, or approval by Congress.20 '
The result of these types of involvement was the creation of situa-
tions in which Congress was faced with Presidential faits accomplis. °6
Instead of deciding whether to authorize hostilities before they began,
Congress was left with little alternative but to formalize circumstances
197. Id.
198. War Powers Resolution Amendments of 1982, S.2179, 97th Congress, 2nd Sess., 189
(Statement by Senator Byrd quoting Senator Javits) [hereinafter referred to as WPR 1982 Amend-
ments]. Vietnam cost the nation 56,000 lives and $200 billion in direct expenditures. The war
obligated the U.S. to another $200 billion in veterans' benefits, and has caused the greatest
national rift since the War between the States. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 108.
199. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 4.
200. General Serv. Emp. U. Local No. 73, 578 F.2d at 367.
201. The Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 29, 1977 (statement of Herbert Hansell, Legal
Advisor).
202. Amendment to WPR, supra note 38, at 186.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 189.
205. U.S. CoNG. & AD. NEws, supra note 181, at 2349.
206. MULLEN, PRESMENMTL POWER AND Pouics 100 (1976).
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already in existence.20 7 Congress had no choice but to accede to the
President." 8
In addition to facing Presidential faits accomplis, Congress was
keenly aware that the United States must never go to war without
the full moral sanction of the American people. 20 9 To wage war without
the full consent of Congress and the people was clearly wrong. 210 For
the American people to participate in war making decisions, the only
practical way was through Congress, and the WPR was intended to
guarantee that participation. 21'
A broad interpretation of hostilities would preclude initial military
involvements, initiated by the President, from escalating into full scale
wars by requiring congressional approval at the incipient stages of
a conflict. By interpreting hostilities broadly, Congress would decide
whether to authorize hostilities before they began, thus avoiding
Presidential faits accomplis. More importantly, by seeking and obtaining
congressional approval before a large scale undeclared war exists, the
President would be guaranteed the moral support and sanction of
the American people.
Thus far, this comment has illustrated that the term hostilities was
considered an adequate term during the WPR hearings. Congress was
opposed to defining hostilities precisely or too narrowly for fear that
the definition would not encompass all emergencies that might arise, 12
and because an ingenious mind could always conjure up a situation
207. Id.
208. Congress, The President, and The Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1771, 1796 (1968).
209. Amendment to WPR, supra note 38, at 192.
210. Id. at 93.
211. An analogy to Maritime law also supports a liberal interpretation of hostilities. Maritime
law defines the term hostilities in a similar context as the WPR, that is, in circumstances in
which risks of warlike behavior exist. Generally a marine insurance policy covers common perils
of the sea and contains a Free from Capture and Seizure clause which eliminates from coverage
certain risks of a warlike nature. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 340
U.S. 54, 55 (1950). The term hostilities as used in the standard exclusion clause has been defined
as actual operations of war either offensive, defensive, or protective by a belligerent. Internat'l
Dairy Eng. Co. of Asia, Inc. v. American Home A. Co., 352 F. Supp. 827, 829 (1970). Courts
have held that hostile activities need not involve the overt use of a weapon which is in itself
capable of inflicting harm. Id. Activities which constitute hostilities, for Maritime purposes,
include the extinguishment of a navigational light, the outfitting of a ship if done for a hostile
purpose, and the dropping of a flare by an unidentified airplane. Id. The Maritime definition
of hostilities is broad when contrasted against the interpretation adopted by the Reagan Ad-
ministration. The interpretation is, however, consistent with the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee definition, in that the definition does not require that actual shots be fired. See 18
HALsaUy's LAWS OF ENGLAND (2nd ed. 1935) §439 at 316; See also lonides v. The Universal
Marine Insurance Company, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 259, 288 (1863); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 122 F. Supp. 109, 111 (1954).
212. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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that avoided a strict definition. 213 By adopting a general definition
of hostilities, something was left to the judgment, intelligence, and
wisdom of Congress and the President.2 '4
As a result of this flexible approach to defining hostilities, two con-
flicting interpretations of the term developed. The first, adopted by
the H.F.A.C., defines hostilities to include both situations in which
fighting has begun, and those in which no shots have been fired but
where a clear and present danger of armed conflict exists. The sec-
ond definition, adopted by the Reagan Administration and consistent
with prior Executive interpretations, is restrictive in requiring an ac-
tual exchange of fire between opposing forces before hostilities are
deemed present.
The President's definition of hostilities cannot stand when viewed
in light of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the WPR,
the purpose and objective of the WPR, and the evil that Congress
sought to prevent. Congress intended a broader definition of hostilities,
one which would ensure that Congress would share in the war mak-
ing process at the onset of military involvement.21 To be consistent
with the spirit of the resolution, hostilities must be defined so that
Congress may debate and discuss whether to authorize hostilities before
they begin. Congress must not be faced with faits accomplis. The
statutory rules of construction dictate that a liberal definition of
hostilities is the proper interpretation. A broad definition, like the
H.F.A.C. definition, consequently, is preferred according to statutory
construction over that of the executive branch.
To date, President Reagan has not accepted the broad interpreta-
tion of hostilities, following instead the restrictive interpretation. As
demonstrated, the restrictive definition is an incorrect interpretation
of hostilities. Since the term hostilities has been misinterpreted by the
Reagan Administration, the situations in Lebanon and Central America
have been reported under the wrong section of the WPR. The next
section of the comment will examine the application of section 4(a)(1)
to both situations.
D. Hostilities and Imminent Hostilities in Lebanon and Central
America
Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR is activated when United States troops
213. The point was made that ". . . an ingenious mind can find an excuse under almost
any set of criteria for doing what he wants to do." 1971 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 13.
214. See supra, note 114, and accompanying text.
215. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 7.
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are introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.216
Imminent involvement in hostilities has not been the subject of con-
flicting interpretations, like the term hostilities. To a large degree,
the H.F.A.C. Report and the definition of Mr. Leigh, the advisor
to President Ford, impart a similar meaning. 217 Both definitions re-
quire a high possibility of armed conflict and encompass those situa-
tions of lesser intensity than hostilities. Although the Reagan Ad-
ministration has not officially announced its definition of imminent
hostilities, recent statements indicate that the Administration does not
consider the situation in Lebanon as constituting imminent hostilities. 28
This section will propose that the magnitude and intensity of the United
States involvement in Lebanon and Central America meet the thres-
hold of military activity necessary to constitute imminent involve-
ment in hostilities. First, the situation in Lebanon will be examined,
followed by a discussion of the United States military posture in Cen-
tral America.
1. Lebanon
The first contingent of United States Marines landed in Beirut at
dawn on August 25, 1982.219 This contingency was sent to help 800
French Legionnaires keep peace as 7000 Palestine Liberation forces,
held under siege since June, were evacuated. 22 The Marines were lightly
armed and were confined to the Beirut port area. 221' The next con-
tingent of Marines entered Beirut September 29-30 and took up posi-
tions around the airport south of the capitol. 222 Nicholas Veliotes,
216. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
217. Compare the H.F.A.C. Report definition of "imminent hostilities," a situation in which
there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation (no shots have been fired
but there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict) or for actual armed conflict" with
Mr. Leigh's definition, "a situation in which a serious risk from hostile fire to the safety of
United States troops was present." See supra notes 154-60 and 161-77 and accompanying text.
The term "imminent hostilities" cannot be found in the WPR. "Situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," however, is a key defini-
tional phrase. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The distinction may be drawn that
there are three distinct situations in which section 4(a)(l) may be activated: when armed forces
are introduced into "hostilities," ."into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances," and where "imminent hostilities" are present. This
writer contends, although these three key terms are present throughout the hearings, and in
subsequent testimony, the use of "imminent hostilities" is merely a more convenient way of
saying "situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances," and therefore, their intended meanings are the same.
218. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at 64, col. 2.
219. 40 CNoGaEssI NAL QuARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 2157.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2469.
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Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, said the
Marines would play a more active role in the peace keeping force
than they did earlier in Beirut.223 This force was larger and equipped
with heavier weapons. 224 The Marines were based at the airport on
the southern edge of the city and patrolled north to the Presidential
palace, securing and occupying positions at intersections.225 Now they
are equipped with several tanks, armored personnel carriers, mortars,
and antitank weapons.226 Their general orders were the same as before
- to defend themselves if fired upon.227 The Marines were more
publicly visible and susceptible than they were in August when limited
to the port area.228 In addition, the Marines were being supported
with United States Sixth Fleet forces, including the aircraft carrier
U.S.S. Independence.229 The airwing of the carrier includes fighter
and attack aircraft and is stationed close to the Lebanese Coast.230
Mr. Veliotes refuted the characterization of the Marine deployment
as "open-ended" and stated that the troops would be in Lebanon
for a limited period of time. 231 The outer limit for withdrawal of
Marines from Lebanon was set for the end of 1982.232
Within twenty-four hours of entering Beirut, one Marine was killed
and three others were wounded when an Israeli shell that the Marines
were trying to defuse exploded.233 Strictly speaking, this may not have
been the result of hostilities, but the casualty indicates the potential
jeopardy facing American troops.234 Besides the bomb incident, the
Beirut International Airport was shelled several times. On July
22, 1983, the shelling resulted in the injury of two Marines and one
Navy air controller. 235 The attack killed twenty-three people and
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Knickerbacker, Open-ended Role for U.S. Marines in Beirut Makes Pentagon Brass
Edgy, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 30, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 40 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 2469.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Representative Zablocki said the death of the Marine, which was characterized as ac-
cidental, "only reinforces the question of whether there may be imminent hostilities." He likened
the situation to a man walking barefoot in a glass factory: "you're bound to get cut." Mr.
Zablocki's opinion was that any further incidents would put Mr. Reagan in the position of
putting himself under the structures of the act. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1982 at 2, col. 5. Senator
Joseph Biden said that the tragic killing of the Marine demonstrates that the American forces
were in a hostile situation. Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1982, at A21, col. 3.
235. San Francisco Examiner, July 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1-6.
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wounded sixty-five, including three servicemen who were wounded by
shrapnel or flying glass.2"6
On August 11, the Druse gunners shelled and rocketed the United
States Marine compound at Beirut airport in one of the worst waves
of violence around the capitol in months. 2" Five civilians were killed
and thirty people were wounded, including Marine First Lieutenant
Morris. 238 A Soviet-made 122-millimeter rocket crashed inside the
Marine compound at dawn, injuring Morris.23 9 The following day,
the airport was hammered with a barrage of twenty rockets. 210 Two
shells from the first two barrages crashed 500 yards from the American
peacekeeping forces, causing Marines to be placed on maximum alert. 241
In response, the Marines fired flares above Druse positions using 81-
millimeter mortars, the first heavy weapons used against other forces
since the Maiines arrived in Lebanon. 242 On August 29, 1983, the
Marines fought a ninety-minute battle with Lebanese militiamen. 243
An army checkpoint where the Marines were stationed came under
attack by rocket-propelled grenades and semiautomatic weapons. 244
The thirty Marines returned the fire, using M-60 machine guns and
M-16 rifles, with no casualties reported. 245 This was the first time
Marines in Lebanon traded fire with Lebanese militia units.2 46
The ninety-minute battle with Lebanese militia units, in and of itself,
constitutes hostilities as defined broadly by the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee. The H.F.A.C. Report stated that hostilities encom-
passed a situation in which no shots have been fired but where a
clear and present danger of armed conflict exists.24 7 During the battle
with militia units, the Marines, in fact, "returned fire on confirmed
targets ' 24 8 and shots were fired amounting to an actual armed con-
flict. The restrictive interpretation of hostilities, adopted by the Reagan
Administration, was defined as any armed confrontation between op-
posing forces involving an exchange of fire. 249 Technically, although
the exchange of fire occurred, this definition may not have been met
236. Id.
237. San Francisco Chronicle, August 11, 1983 at 1, col 5.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 20, col. 5.
240. The Sacramento Bee, August 12, 1983, at A3, col. 5.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983 at Y1, col. 4.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
248. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at Y4, col. 1.
249. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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because the Marines are part of a peacekeeping force.25 The militia
units, therefore, may not be considered opposing forces.
The following day, two Marines were killed and fourteen were
wounded in the second involvement of combat.25" ' In response to heavy
and protracted mortar fire that lasted five hours, the Marines used
artillery mortars and helicopter gunships to silence batteries in the
hills near the airport.2 52 On August 31, the Marines came under at-
tack from all three of the positions they maintained near Beirut
Airport. 253 The Marines fired back with M-16 rifles, M-60 machine
guns, and flares, and two Cobra helicopters were sent aloft.2"4 Some
State Department and Defense Department officials said that the at-
tacks by Druse and Shiite Moslem fighters seemed to be coordinated
against the multinational peacekeeping forces.255
Despite the serious military fighting involving American troops,
President Reagan has declined to invoke section 4(a)(1) of the WPR.2 56
Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, opposed invoking sec-
tion 4(a)(1), and considered the fighting as "an isolated incident" '257
placing significant emphasis on the peacekeeping status of American
forces.25 8 Secretary of State George Schultz said the situation could
not yet be classified as hostilities involving the Marines.259 Rather,
he said, the Marines were caught in the midst of widespread violence
not necessarily directed at them.2 61 In effect, the Reagan Administra-
tion has avoided reporting under section 4(a)(1) by skewing the facts
in favor of its position, classifying the fighting as isolated incidents,
and emphasizing the neutral peacekeeping role of the Marines.
The neutral peacekeeping role of the Marines has been refuted by
Walid Jumblat, the Druse leader. Mr Jumblat accused the Marines
of siding with the Christian-dominated Lebanese Army. 261 Since the
Marines are providing the Lebanese factional army with logistical sup-
port, expertise and training, this proved enough for the Druse to con-
sider the Marines as "enemies. 2 62 Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite
250. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1983, at Y6, col. 2.
251. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1983, at Y1, col. 4.
252. Id. at Y6, col. 5.
253. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1983, at Yl, col. 6.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 46, col 1.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Qwertzman, Schultz Refuses to Classify Clashes as Hostilities Involving Marines, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 1, 1983 at Y1, col. 6.
260. Id.
261. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at Y8, col. 2.
262. Id.
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Moslems, stated that the Marines had "turned into a fighting force
against Moslems in Lebanon." '263
In response to the increased fighting, President Reagan ordered a
2000 member Marine force into the Mediterranean to secure the safety
of the Marines already on shore.2 64 Additionally, American F-14 Tom-
cat fighters from the carrier Eisenhower have roared over Beirut with
the mission of protecting American troops.265 United States Navy
fire power also entered the war when the frigate Bowen fired four 5-inch
shells at Druse artillery batteries located in the foothills overlooking
Beirut.266 United States air power has been reinforced with arrival
of the Tarawa, a 30,000-ton American amphibious assault ship that
carries six Harrier Jump jets built for ground attack missions.2 67
Although attacks upon United States Marines occur daily and United
States military involvement deepens, the Reagan Administration in-
sists that hostilities are not present in Lebanon.268 Viewing these events
vis-a-vis the broad definition of hostilities adopted by the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, the logical conclusion is that a clear and
presefht danger of armed conflict is present in a situation where forces
are actively engaged in armed conflict, using 155-millimeter howitzers,
81-millimeter mortars, and cobra helicopters, and where those forces
are being supported by an aircraft carrier. Even the restrictive defini-
tion of hostilities adopted by the Reagan Administration has been
met by the fighting taking place in Lebanon. Armed confrontation
between opposing forces involving an exchange of fire is occurring
between United States Marines and the Lebanese Militia almost daily. 269
Since hostilities are apparent in Lebanon, the President must follow
the law and acknowledge this fact by reporting to Congress pursuant
to section 4(a)(1) of the WPR. By doing so, he will allow Congress
to undoubtedly approve deployment of the Marines, and ultimately, to
more strongly support his decision to deploy Marines in Lebanon.
The President also must follow the law with respect to military ac-
tivities in Central America by reporting to Congress pursuant to sec-
tion 4(a)(1).
263. Id.
264. Id. at Yl, col. 1.
265. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at Y1, col. 6.
266. Id.
267. Middleton, Fighting in Lebanon: Balance of Forces, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at
Y6, col. 1.
268. Smith, U.S. Will Protect Marines, Bush Warns, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at Y6,
col. 1.
269. See supra, notes 243, 251, 253 and accompanying text.
1984 / War Powers Resolution
2. Central America-In the Shadow of War Ships
United States military activities in Central America have assumed,
a higher profile and new significance as a result of the importance
attached to the conflict by President Reagan. 7 ' The President believes
that for the first time, the United States faces real danger on its
borders, and that the government must protect the safety and secur-
ity of the American people.27 The Reagan Administration is involved
in a major escalation of United States presence in Central America." 2
A major expansion of covert operations is part of the plan to increase
American military activities in the region. 273 These plans include
stepped-up support for antigovernment insurgents in Nicaragua and
a campaign of sabotage against Nicaragua.2 71 The expanded program
makes the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency the most ex-
tensive operations since Vietnam.2 71
In addition to the covert and sabotage operations against Nicaragua,
the United States is involved in large scale military exercises of ground,
naval, and air forces.2 76 Honduras is the focus of United States
maneuvers. 27 7 To date, 5000 American troops are involved in military
maneuvers with Hondurans.2 7s These maneuvers are expected to con-
tinue in 1984.279 So far, ten war ships are involved in military maneuvers
off the coast of Central America with eleven other ships on the way.280
The exercises are considered unusual in their scale, duration, and prox-
imity to combat areas.2 8' Specifically, the exercises are designed to
lay the groundwork for expanded American presence and to test and
270. A Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, supra note 166, at 248.
271. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1983, at Y1, col. 5.
272. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, at Y1, col. 6.
273. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at Y1, col. 6.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. The ground and aircraft exercises, in particular, would underline the swift expansion
of Honduras as the center of U.S. military activity. Engineer battalions are expected to clear
two or three airstrips in a week to accommodate C-5 Galaxy transports, the Air Force's largest,
and any type of fighter plane. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1983, at 44, col. 1. The airforces of the
U.S. and Honduras also will hold air exercises for planning air strikes, using U.S. Air Force
spotter planes and Honduran ground attack aircraft. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, at Y3, col.
4. Some Hondurans consider the U.S. Military maneuvers as transforming their country into
a "platform for war." They believe that if the U.S. wants to defeat the Nicaraguans and can-
not do it covertly, the U.S. will involve Honduras in a war. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1983, at
Y3, col. 4.
277. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1983, at 44, col. 1.
278. Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1983, at 35.
279. Id.
280. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983, at IE, col. 3.
281. Rennert, Kissinger: No Drastic U.S. Action, The Sacramento Bee, July 26, 1983 at
A13, col. 5.
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refine plans for a military quarantine around Nicaragua.282 A quaran-
tine, which involves the use of naval force to isolate a nation, falls
short of a formal blockade, which is considered tantamount to an
act of war. 2 3 Administration officials say that the imposition of a
partial naval blockade of Nicaragua would represent a major increase
in military hostilities in the region and could place American forces
in confrontation with Soviet merchant vessels.28 In August 1983, an
American destroyer shadowed a Soviet freighter off the coast of
Nicaragua for twenty-four hours. 215 The freighter allegedly contained
a cargo of helicopters and spare parts for an air transport.286 Although
the American destroyer did not interdict the freighter, the incident
added to congressional nervousness about the President's intentions
and strategies.287
The expanded military presence in Central America by the United
States includes the positioning of new radar and electronic surveillance
posts, the accumulation of large stocks of military equipment in Hon-
duras, and the construction of a $150 million air and naval base on
the coast of Honduras.288 This deepening involvement in Central
America, illustrated by an array of military thrusts into the region,
has heightened concern that the United States may be heading toward
the use of combat forces in the region. 28 9 As of September 1983,
fifty-five military advisors are in El Salvador.29 A proposal to in-
crease the number to 125 in 1984, and to broaden the scope of the
flexibility of the advisors to permit the accompanying of Salvadoran
forces into the field is being considered.2 9' Since any increase in the
number of advisors might be considered as an effort to further
Americanize the war in El Salvador, the Defense Department sug-
gested tightening the definition of advisor to ensure that some American
personnel are not counted under any ceiling on advisors.2 92 Wide con-
cern has been expressed that the training role of advisors could spill
over into combat, producing the kind of slow, steady increase in
American involvement that marked the initial phases of the Vietnam
War. 93 To date, military advisor Lieutenant Schaufelberger is the
282. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
283. Id.
284. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at Y5, col. 1.
285. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1983, at Yl, col. 6.
286. Id.
287. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1983, at Y4, col. 2.
288. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, at Y4, col. 2.
289. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at Y5, col. 1.
290. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at Yl, col. 6.
291. Id.
292. Id. at Y8, col. 4.
293. Id.
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only American military fatality in El Salvador.2 94 Following his death,
threats were made that all United States advisors would be sent back
home in coffins. 29- Additionally, an Army Sergeant was shot by left-
ists forces while riding in a helicopter during an operational mission. 296
Should the President consider whether the WPR is implicated, these
incidents would most likely be considered by the Administration as
sporadic instances of violence, and therefore, not hostilities or immi-
nent involvement in hostilities. When coupled with the overall major
military escalation in Central America, which includes the twenty-one
war ships to be involved in naval maneuvers,297 the proposed quaran-
tine of Nicaragua,2 9 the covert war against Nicaragua, 299 and the
general mood of war in the region,3"' then a situation exists in which
imminent involvement in hostilities is present. According to the
H.F.A.C. Report, imminent hostilities involve a situation in which
a clear potential for a state of confrontation or actual armed con-
294. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
296. 41 CONGEssIoNA QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 342.
297. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
300. The Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, the Rev. Miguel d'Escoto Brockman, was quoted
by United Press International from Managua as refusing to deny that the Soviet Union had
been shipping arms to Nicaragua. He said: "There is a war being waged against our country."
The U.S. covert operation against Nicaragua has been of sufficient intensity to be character-
ized as a secret war, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1983, at Y25, col. 2, and as an undeclared war
of President Reagan's. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, at Y17, col. 2.
301. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
302. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
303. The most striking analogy between the experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador in-
volves the world view and political policy makers in Washington. Mohn, Salvador and Viet-
nam, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1983, at Y1, col. 3. United States officials in the 1960's initially
viewed the war in South Vietnam as a challenge originating in Peking and Moscow, and the
more direct support of the Vietcong from North Vietnam. Id. In much the same spirit, Presi-
dent Reagan stated that the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest in Central America. Id. Secretary
of State, A. Haig, said that the problem in El Salvador was external intervention in the foreign
affairs of a sovereign nation. Id. Another similarity grows from the fact that in both situations
the U.S. began by trying to fight a proxy war and assume an advisory role. Id. In this connec-
tion both the South Vietnamese government of 1961 and the Salvadoran government of 1980
did not seem to many critics to be the most suitable instruments or proxies with which to
wage a war. Id. Other similarities between the war in Vietnam and El Salvador include an
automatic promotion policy which gives key command jobs to officers on the basis of political
reliability rather than merit; a military resistance against adopting a strong and persistent
belief that the holding of elections in the proxy nation will create a legitimate government
and cripple the rebel movement; withdrawal by the U.S. is not considered a serious option;
and human rights was considered an issue in both wars. Id. Contra. President Reagan stated
that the beginning stages between U.S. activity in El Salvador and the beginning stages in Viet-
nam was "profound." A Special Study of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, supra note 167,
at 250. See also A Symposium: Vietnam-Era Aides Explore Parallels and Differences, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1983, at 5, col. 1.; Using El Salvador to Battle The Ghosts of Vietnam, The
Washington Post, March 1, 1981, at Cl.
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flict may be found. 01 Because the totality of the circumstances in-
dicates a clear potential for a state of confrontation between United
States troops and Soviet or Nicaraguan forces, President Reagan is
required to report to Congress pursuant to section 4(a)(1) of the WPR.
The need for a report under section 4(a)(1), thereby requiring a
decision to be made by Congress, is underscored by the general lack
of congressional and public support for the United States buildup
in Central America. 30 2 Very strong analogies between American in-
volvement in the guerilla war in El Salvador and the United States
role in Vietnam have been drawn. 31 3 A recent Gallup poll indicated
that a majority of Americans fear that the United States will become
embroiled in a Vietnam-like commitment.304
Considering the facts present in Central America, where the poten-
tial for a state of military confrontation clearly exists, President Reagan
is required pursuant to the WPR to report to Congress under section
4(a)(1). President Reagan must obtain the approval of the American
people through their congressional representatives to be assured of
sufficient public support to wage war, if necessary, in Central America.
E. Conclusion
The War Powers Resolution, enacted over a presidential veto nearly
ten years ago, 33 has never been more relevant than now with United
States Marines in Lebanon and Central America. By adopting a restric-
tive definition of the term hostilities, the Reagan Administration has
evaded the effects of section 4(a)(1) of the WPR. President Reagan
has avoided the requirement of obtaining congressional approval to
maintain United States troops in Lebanon and Central America.
This author has illustrated that Congress intended a broad defini-
tion of hostilities, not a restrictive interpretation. The circumstances
existing at the time the WPR was enacted, 0 6 the objective and
purpose of the WPR, 307 and the evil which Congress sought to pre-
vent by enacting the WPR30 all support a liberal interpretation of
304. A majority of Americans questioned by Gallup pollsters say they continue to think
that the U.S. will become involved in El Salvador as it was in Vietnam, and nearly half disap-
prove of President Reagan's policies in Central America. Seventy-one percent of the people
familiar with the situation in El Salvador felt that there was at least a fairly likely chance
that the U.S. would become more deeply involved. Gruson, Poll Reveals Fear of a New Viet-
nam, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983 at Y8, col. 6.
305. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
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hostilities. Furthermore, the spirit in which the WPR was enacted in-
dicates that hostilities must be defined broadly." 9
By applying the definition of hostilities intended by Congress to
the situation in Lebanon, hostilities obviously exist. This author,
therefore, contends that President Reagan is not properly complying
with the law °10 By insisting upon a self-serving definition of hostilities,
and claiming that the fighting in Beirut is only the result of sporadic
incidents of violence not covered by the WPR,3" President Reagan
309. See supra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
310. If Congress were to initiate suit in federal court seeking presidential compliance with the
WPR, the court would be squarely confronted with the political question doctrine. The political
question doctrine is that principle under which the courts defer the determination of an issue
to the political branches of government. Firmage, The War Powers and The Political Question
Doctrine, 49 UNrv. CoLO. L. REv. 65,66 (1977). Numerous law review articles have been writ-
ten which address the political question doctrine relative to the WPR. See Firmage, The War
Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 UNiv. OF CoLO. L. Rav. 65 (1977); Keynes,
Democracy, Judicial Review, and the War Powers, 8 Omo NORTHERN UNrv. L. R. 69 (1981);
Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control Over the
War Power, 71 Am. J. INT'L L. 605, 640 (1970). In Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893,
898 (1982), the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia held that an action initiated
by 29 members of Congress against President Reagan was non-justiciable. The action challenged
the conduct of the President and the Secretaries of Defense and State in supplying military
equipment and aid to El Salvador in violation of the WPR. The court concluded that the
factfinding necessary to determine whether U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities or
imminent hostilities in El Salvador rendered the case nonjusticiable, but did not dismiss the
case on political question grounds. Id. at 898. At that time, the court faced a dispute as to
whether a small number of military personnel who apparently suffered no casualties had been
introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.
In its political question discussion, the court stated that the suit was not of the type which
involved potential judicial interference with executive discretion in foreign affairs. Id. Rather,
plaintiffs sought to enforce existing law concerning procedures for decision-making. The court
stated that the issue was not a political question simply because it involved the apportionment
of power between the executive and legislative branches, and that the duty of the courts to
decide these questions had been reaffirmed repeatedly. Id.
Although the court lacked the resources and expertise to resolve disputed questions of fact
concerning the military situations in El Salvador, the court admitted that a case could arise
with facts less elusive. Vietnam was an example of the type of situation in which the court
felt that to decline to find that U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities would be an
absurdity. Id. at 898, 899. Since questions of standing, equitable discretion, and private right
of action were not fully decided, the Crockett court did not conclude that a court should enter-
tain an action to enforce the WPR when the existence of involvement is clearly ascertainable.
Id. at 899.
The court stated that although other barriers to a similar action might exist, the political
question doctrine would not be one of them. Were Congress to pass a resolution stating that
a report was required under the WPR, or that the forces should be withdrawn, and the Presi-
dent disregarded the resolution, the court stated that a constitutional impasse appropriate for
judicial resolution would be presented. Id.
Because of the discrepancy regarding the facts in El Salvador at the time of the suit, the
court lacked judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolution of the Crockett
suit. In contrast, the facts in Lebanon and Central America today, as already pointed out
by this writer, are less elusive than those in Crockett, and the military activity is of sufficient
intensity that the existence of involvement in hostilities is easily ascertainable. Crockett, in ef-
fect, removes the political question barrier if Congress reaches an impasse with the President
and decides to initiate suit in federal court.
311. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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is weaving amidst the shadows of the law, disregarding the purpose
and spirit of the WPR.
The military posture of American involvement in Central America
is substantially different from that in Lebanon. In Central America,
fewer American deaths have occurred as well as less actual fighting
by American forces.3" 2 The concern, however, is that the United
States will become involved in another situation like Vietnam.3'3 The
major expansion and escalation of American presence in Central
America substantially increases the likelihood of involvement in
hostilities. When taken into full account, the military posture in Cen-
tral America requires that President Reagan seek congressional ap-
proval pursuant to section 4(a)(1) of the WPR.
William H. Hardy Jr.
312. Compare supra note 23 and accompanying text with supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
313. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
